State v. Mobley Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 39074 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-7-2012
State v. Mobley Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39074
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Mobley Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39074" (2012). Not Reported. 443.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/443
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
JOSEPH PAUL MOBLEY, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________ ) 
NO. 39074 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
HONORABLE JUNEAL C. KERRICK 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
SARAH E. TOMPKINS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #7901 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P .0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL. .................................................................... 15 
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................... 16 
The District Court Violated Mr. Mobley's Right To Due Process 
When The Court Provided The Jury With A "Dynamite" 
Instruction Upon Being Informed That The Jury Was 
Deadlocked As To One Of The Counts In This Case .................................... 16 
A. Introduction ........................................................................................... 16 
B. Standard Of Review ................................................................................. 16 
C. The District Court Violated Mr. Mobley's Right To Due Process 
When The Court Provided The Jury With A "Dynamite" 
Instruction Upon Being Informed That The Jury Was 
Deadlocked As To One Of The Counts In This Case, 
And This Error Rose To The Level Of A Fundamental Error .................... 16 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 23 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 24 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733 (Ct. App. 2003) ............................................... 22 
State v. Bailey, 94 Idaho 285 (1971) .................................................................. 20 
State v. Clay, 112 Idaho 261 (Ct. App. 1987) ......................................... 18, 22, 23 
State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576 (2011) ............................................................... 16 
State v. Flint, 114 Idaho 806 ( 1988) ............................................................. 19, 20 
State v. Gomez, 137 Idaho 671 (2002) ......................................................... 18, 21 
State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590 (Ct. App. 1992) ................................................ 22 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010) .................................................................. 17 
State v. Timmons, 141 Idaho 376 (Ct. App. 2005) .............................................. 19 
II 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Joseph Mobley appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence for felony 
domestic battery following a jury trial. 1 The district court in this case, when confronted 
with the information that the jury was split on one of the charges and did not know how 
to proceed, instructed the jury to consult only one paragraph of a single jury instruction 
and to continue to deliberate. This paragraph instructed the jurors to consult with one 
another and consider each other's views with the objective of reaching a verdict. The 
district court did not instruct the jurors to consider the paragraph that followed, which 
instructed the jurors not to surrender their individual opinions solely for the purpose of 
returning a unanimous verdict; did not inform the jurors that a unanimous verdict was 
not required; and did not direct them to consider the remaining jury instructions. The 
district court also took this action unilaterally and did not consult with trial counsel for 
Mr. Mobley or the State until after the court had already directed the jurors to consider 
this single paragraph and ordered them to continue deliberating. Mr. Mobley asserts 
that this instruction constituted an impermissible "dynamite" instruction that violated his 
constitutional right to due process and that requires reversal of his judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Joseph Mobley was charged with attempted strangulation and felony domestic 
battery. (R., pp.20-21.) The State further sought an enhancement on the charge of 
1 Mr. Mobley was also charged by the State with attempted strangulation, but was 
subsequently acquitted of this charge at trial. 
1 
domestic battery due to the State's claim that the alleged battery occurred within the 
presence of a minor child. (R., pp.22-23.) These charges were based on an alleged 
altercation that took place between Mr. Mobley and his then- girlfriend, Laurel Deboi, 
who shared a residence with Mr. Mobley and with whom she had a child in common. 
(R., pp.6-8.) 
At Mr. Mobley's first trial on these charges, the jury was unable to reach a verdict 
as to any of the alleged offenses, and further could not reach a verdict as to any of the 
lesser included offenses of the domestic battery charge. (R., pp.39-53.) After finding 
that the jury was deadlocked and further deliberations would be futile, the trial court 
declared a mistrial. (R., pp.50-51.) 
Prior to the retrial, the State filed two motions in limine with the district court. 
(R., pp.56-64.) In the first, the State asked the district court to issue an order prohibiting 
Mr. Mobley from testifying at trial about whether Ms. Deboi took property from their 
apartment or withdrew funds from Ms. Deboi and Mr. Mobley's joint account after 
Mr. Mobley was arrested. (R., pp.56-58.) The State argued that this evidence was 
irrelevant and posed the danger of confusing the jury as to the disputed issues at trial. 
(R., pp.56-58.) 
In the State's second motion in limine, the State asked the court to preclude 
Mr. Mobley from presenting any evidence at all about "specific incidences [of] physical 
or verbal aggression or acts committed in the past between the victim or irrelevant 
character evidence of the victim." (R., pp.60.) The State contended that such evidence 
was irrelevant, posed the danger of confusing the jury, and was impermissible character 
evidence under I.R.E. 608(b). (R., pp.60-64.) 
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The State reiterated its request at the hearing on the State's motions in limine. 
(3/18/11 Tr. 2, p.1, L.4 - p.3, L.19.) At this hearing, the State also clarified that it was 
seeking to exclude evidence of Ms. Deboi's past acts of violence and history of physical 
altercations on the basis of I.R.E. 402(b), rather than 608(b). (3/18/11 Tr., p.2, L.19 -
p.3, L.13.) Mr. Mobley pointed out that much of the evidence disputed by the State 
came in at his prior trial for reasons unrelated to the grounds upon which the State 
objected, including Ms. Deboi's potential motive as a witness for the State and as 
impeachment of her credibility. (3/18/11 Tr., p.3, L.21 - p.4, L.25.) The district court 
denied the State's motion seeking to preclude Mr. Mobley from eliciting testimony about 
Ms. Deboi having taken Mr. Mobley's personal property and money, but delayed ruling 
on whether Mr. Mobley could elicit evidence of Ms. Deboi's history of violence until trial. 
(3/18/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.1-6.) 
Ms. Deboi was the first witness presented for the State at Mr. Mobley's trial. She 
testified that she and Mr. Mobley were in a dating relationship, shared a child in 
common, and lived together at the time of the alleged battery. (Trial Tr., p.129, L.14 -
p.131, L.25.) On the day of the altercation, Ms. Deboi testified that she and Mr. Mobley 
had been fighting throughout the day and that Mr. Mobley had also been drinking. (Trial 
Tr., p.132, L.17 - p.134, L.2.) At some point during the evening hours, Ms. Deboi 
alleged that her dispute with Mr. Mobley turned physical. (Trial Tr., p.134, L.23 - p.135, 
L.2.) 
Ms. Deboi testified that she and Mr. Mobley were in their bedroom at the time. 
(Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.3-5.) According to Ms. Deboi, her and Mr. Mobley's bedroom also 
2 Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case, and for 
ease of reference, citations made herein to the transcripts of proceedings other than the 
trial transcript are made in accordance with the date of the proceeding transcribed. 
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contained the dining room area, as well as their daughter's bed, a computer desk, and a 
sofa. (Trial Tr., p.136, L.19 - p.138, L.12.) The argument between them escalated 
when Mr. Mobley was having a difficult time getting their daughter to eat. (Trial 
Tr., p.138, L.14 - p.139, L.6.) According to Ms. Debo i's testimony, Mr. Mobley set their 
daughter on her bed and then turned and pushed Ms. Deboi into a nightstand. (Trial 
Tr., p.139, L.21 - p.140, L.5.) 
Ms. Deboi testified that Mr. Mobley then kicked her between her neck and 
shoulder blade and knocked her to the ground. According to her testimony, Mr. Mobley 
then kicked her several more times in the head, stomach, and legs. (Trial Tr., p.140, 
Ls.9-25.) Ms. Deboi also testified that she saw Mr. Mobley's other daughter peeking 
through the doorway to the bedroom from further down the hallway. (Trial Tr., p.141, 
Ls.1-3.) 
Mr. Mobley left the room to try to make a phone call, according to Ms. Deboi's 
testimony, but returned after being unable to make the call. (Trial Tr., p.141, L.23 -
p.143, L.3.) During this time, Ms. Deboi was packing a suitcase in order to leave the 
apartment. (Trial Tr., p.141, L.23 - p.143, L.3.) Ms. Deboi testified that, upon turning 
back to the bedroom to finish packing, Mr. Mobley was behind her and grabbed her by 
the throat. (Trial Tr., p.143, L.13 - p.144, L.9.) He then left the room and she continued 
to pack a suitcase. (Trial Tr., p.144, Ls.10-13.) Ms. Deboi then claimed that Mr. Mobley 
hit her in the eye with a closed fist when she went to a closet to grab a sweatshirt. (Trial 
Tr., p.144, Ls.14-23.) Ms. Deboi did not call the police at this point, but left the 
apartment with her daughter. (Trial Tr., p.145, L.18 - p.146, L.10.) She also claimed 
that Mr. Mobley had broken her cell phone "in half" before Ms. Deboi had the chance to 
leave the apartment. (Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.5-7.) 
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After leaving the apartment, Ms. Deboi first stopped at a neighbor's house, Lisa 
Voss, to tell them that she and Mr. Mobley would probably not be attending a barbeque 
that was planned for the following day. (Trial Tr., p.146, L.17- p.147, L.14.) She then 
went to the house of her friend, Marissa Hone. (Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.8-14.) While there, 
Ms. Deboi decided to go to the hospital, although she did not call the police. (Trial 
Tr., p.148, L.24 - p.150, L.12.) 
Following her trip to the hospital, Ms. Deboi testified that she retrieved her and 
Mr. Mobley's daughter and then stayed at her brother's house. (Trial Tr., p.150, L.20 -
p.151, L.14.) The following day, Ms. Deboi acquired a new cell phone and then 
returned to her apartment to take some items. (Trial Tr., p.151, L.17 - p.152, L.8.) She 
also withdrew approximately $2,500 from her and Mr. Mobley's joint bank account. 
(Trial Tr., p.153, L.10 - p.154, L.1.) Ms. Deboi testified that she paid bills with this 
money. (Trial Tr., p.154, Ls.2-3.) 
Regarding her injuries, Ms. Deboi testified that she was bruised around her eye, 
neck, arms, and legs. (Trial Tr., p.154, L.15 - p.155, L.3.) The State also submitted 
photographic exhibits of these injuries that were taken approximately one week after the 
alleged altercation. (Trial Tr., p.155, L.4 - p.158, L.1.) 
On cross-examination, Mr. Mobley drew out several inconsistencies 
between Ms. Deboi's trial testimony and prior versions of events that she had provided 
to police and during court proceedings. First, Mr. Mobley noted that the photographic 
exhibit of the bedroom shared by Ms. Deboi and Mr. Mobley did not show any 
disturbance of the furniture that would accompany an extended physical struggle. (Trial 
Tr., p.158, L.15 - p.159; State's Exhibit 1.) Ms. Deboi claimed this was due to the fact 
that Mr. Mobley only pushed her once into the night stand, and that he did not push her 
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very hard. (Trial Tr., p.159, Ls.1-15.) She claimed that nothing in the room appeared to 
be disturbed by the other alleged incidents of violence because she did not fight back. 
(Trial Tr., p.159, Ls.12-24.) 
However, Ms. Deboi subsequently acknowledged that, in her sworn statement 
when seeking a protection order, she claimed that Mr. Mobley had pushed her into 
several objects throughout the bedroom. (Trial Tr., p.160, L.5 - p.162, L.5.) Ms. Deboi 
also admitted that she had not immediately told Ms. Hone or the police about being 
choked, and told an officer that she had been choked only when he prompted her about 
whether that had occurred. (Trial Tr., p.163, L.7 - p.164, L.1.) 
When asked why she did nothing to fight back or seek to defend herself during 
the alleged battery, Ms. Deboi testified that this was because she loved Mr. Mobley and 
because she was "not a violent person." (Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.6-10.) But Ms. Deboi 
admitted thereafter that she was fired at one of her jobs for shoving another man into a 
wall, and was kicked out of a fast food restaurant for getting into a verbal fight with an 
employee there. (Trial Tr., p.170, L.11 - p.171, L.24.) 
Ms. Deboi also initially denied multiple times that Mr. Mobley had ever threatened 
to seek custody of their daughter during their alleged fight. (Trial Tr., p.171, L. 25 -
p.172, L.15.) However, Mr. Mobley presented Ms. Deboi with her sworn statement, 
tendered in seeking a no contact order, in which she represented to the court that, 
during the argument, Mr. Mobley had threatened to take their daughter away based on 
his belief that Ms. Deboi was an unfit mother. (Trial Tr., p.172, L.16 - p.173, L.17.) 
When Mr. Mobley asked Ms. Deboi whether she had withheld their daughter from 
Mr. Mobley following the alleged altercation, the district court sustained the State's 
objection that this evidence was irrelevant. (Trial Tr., p.173, Ls.18-22.) Ms. Deboi also 
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admitted during cross-examination that she drained between $2,500 and $2,600 in two 
days immediately after this fight. (Trial Tr., p.173, L. 24 - p.174, L.16.) She denied that 
she did so in order to prevent Mr. Mobley from having any money upon his release or 
from getting a lawyer in order to obtain custody of his daughter. (Trial Tr., p.175, L.25 -
p.176, L.6.) 
Ms. Voss was the next witness presented by the State. Ms. Voss testified that, in 
the early evening hours of the night of the alleged battery, she saw Ms. Deboi briefly. 
(Trial Tr., p.182, L.12- p.185, L.9.) According to Ms. Voss' testimony, they talked for a 
short time, but Ms. Deboi never left her truck during this conversation. (Trial Tr., p.184, 
L.23 - p.186, L.25.) Ms. Voss testified that Ms. Deboi appeared to be in shock and had 
a white mark on her face that was developing a bluish tinge around the edges. (Trial 
Tr., p.187, L.12 - p.188, L.24.) Ms. Voss believed that the mark on Ms. Deboi's face 
looked like a bruise was about to develop there. (Trial Tr., p.187, L.23 - p.188, L.2.) 
The next witness for the State was Ms. Hone. (Trial Tr., p.194, Ls.23-25.) She 
testified that she and her friend, Tanya Ambler, were having a barbeque with some 
other people at her house on the night of the alleged altercation when Ms. Deboi 
arrived. (Trial Tr., p.196, Ls.3-22.) Ms. Hone also testified that, when Ms. Deboi came 
into the house, she had a large bruise and a lump on her face near her eye. (Trial 
Tr., p.197, Ls.8-19.) Although Ms. Hone wanted Ms. Deboi to go to a hospital, 
Ms. Deboi was initially resistant to the idea. (Trial Tr., p.197, Ls.20-25.) 
According to Ms. Hone's testimony, Ms. Deboi became dizzy about 10-15 
minutes after arriving at Ms. Hone's house. At this point, Ms. Deboi agreed to go to a 
hospital. (Trial Tr., p.197, L.24 - p.198, L.5.) Neither Ms. Deboi nor Ms. Hone 
contacted the police. (Trial Tr., p.198, Ls.12-25.) In addition to the bruising and the 
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lump on Ms. Deboi's face, Ms. Hone testified that she also saw a shoe-like imprint on 
Ms. Deboi's neck. (Trial Tr., p.199, L.21 -p.200, L.2.) 
During cross-examination, Ms. Hone admitted that her prior statement to police 
put Ms. Deboi's arrival at her home significantly later in the evening than her testimony 
at trial - at approximately 7: 15 as opposed to her trial testimony that Ms. Deboi arrived 
at approximately 6:00. (Trial Tr., p.196, L.23 - p.197, L.3, p.201, Ls.7-11.) When asked 
if Ms. Deboi stated whether she had gone somewhere else between her apartment and 
Ms. Hone's house, Ms. Hone initially testified that Ms. Deboi claimed that she came 
straight to Ms. Hone's house. (Trial Tr., p.202, Ls.5-19.) Ms. Hone then corrected her 
testimony and said that Ms. Deboi had not indicated one way or the other as to whether 
she had gone anywhere else before arriving at Ms. Hone's house. (Trial Tr., p.202, 
Ls.20-23.) Ms. Hone also admitted that, at the time of the alleged altercation, she and 
her husband owed money to Mr. Mobley. (Trial Tr., p.203, Ls.3-17.) But she claimed 
that there was no real tension between herself and Mr. Mobley despite the fact that she 
had not yet repaid this debt. (Trial Tr., p.203, Ls.16-22.) 
Ms. Ambler, who was also present at Ms. Hone's home when Ms. Deboi arrived 
there, was the next witness to testify for the State. (Trial Tr., p.205, Ls.9-11.) She 
testified that, when Ms. Deboi arrived at Ms. Hone's home, Ms. Deboi's eye was very 
swollen and she looked like she had been crying. (Trial Tr., p.206, L.24 - p.207, L.6.) 
Notably, and contrary to Ms. Deboi's testimony that Mr. Mobley had snapped her phone 
in half, Ms. Ambler saw Ms. Deboi's phone largely intact. According to Ms. Ambler, 
Ms. Deboi claimed that Mr. Mobley had merely removed the SIM3 card from the phone. 
(Tr., p.148, Ls.5-7; p.207, Ls.10-16.) Ms. Ambler testified that it was Ms. Deboi who 
3 Subscriber Identification Module. 
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slammed the phone down on the ground - and that there was nothing that appeared 
unusual about the phone other than the missing SIM card that Ms. Deboi claimed was 
taken by Mr. Mobley. (Trial Tr., p.207, Ls.12-16, p.211, L.20 - p.212, L.6.) 
Ms. Ambler testified that Ms. Deboi did not want to call the police, but she did 
eventually end up going to the hospital once she began to feel dizzy and nauseous. 
(Trial Tr., p.209, Ls.18-24.) Ms. Ambler further stated that Ms. Deboi never indicated 
whether she had been anywhere else between leaving her apartment and arriving at 
Ms. Hone's residence. (Trial Tr., p.210, Ls.9-13.) 
The next witness presented by the State was Nampa police officer Brandon 
Moerles. (Trial Tr., p.214, Ls.21-25.) Officer Moerles was dispatched to the hospital on 
the night of the alleged altercation based upon a report of a potential domestic violence 
incident. (Tr., p.215, L.24 - p.216, L.9.) Based upon Ms. Deboi's responses to the 
officer in investigating the report, the officer testified that he had determined that a crime 
had occurred. Officer Moerles further testified that he determined that the crimes were 
domestic battery and attempted strangulation. (Trial Tr., p.217, Ls.12-24.) He testified 
that he based this conclusion both on Ms. Deboi's statements to him and on the injuries 
that he observed - a black eye, a "rug burn" and red marks on Ms. Deboi's neck. (Trial 
Tr., p.218, Ls.1-7.) Officer Moerles also testified that Mr. Mobley became a suspect 
based upon his investigation. (Trial Tr., p.218, Ls.11-15.) 
Following his interview with Ms. Deboi, Officer Moerles went to Mr. Mobley's 
home to question him. (Trial Tr., p.218, L.25 - p.219, L.15.) The officer testified that, 
Mr. Mobley had an injury on his hand where two of Mr. Mobley's fingers were taped 
together. (Trial Tr., p.220, Ls.9-13.) This injury was the result of an accident that had 
happened four days prior to the alleged altercation between Mr. Mobley and Ms. Deboi. 
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(Trial Tr., p.220, Ls.14-18.) The officer did not take any photographs of Mr. Mobley's 
hand or ask him whether he had been injured by Ms. Deboi. (Trial Tr., p.220, L.21 -
p.221, L.2, p.224, Ls.6-20.) He also did not see any disturbance or any sign of a 
struggle in the bedroom where the altercation was alleged to have taken place, or any 
signs of any items that were out of place or broken. (Trial Tr., p.226, L.20 - p.227, L.6.) 
Officer Bryce Martin of the Nampa police department also testified on behalf of 
the State. (Trial Tr., p.232, Ls.17-23.) As with Officer Moerles, Officer Martin also was 
dispatched to the hospital based upon a report of a suspected domestic violence 
incident against Ms. Deboi. (Trial Tr., p.234, L.22 - p.235, L.3.) Officer Martin also took 
pictures of Ms. Deboi's injuries while he was at the hospital. The officer testified that he 
observed that Ms. Deboi had a black and swollen eye and red marks on Ms. Deboi's 
neck. (Trial Tr., p.236, Ls.4-18.) He believed that the marks on Ms. Deboi's neck were 
indicative of an attempted strangulation. (Trial Tr., p.237, Ls.2-5.) 
After investigating at the hospital, Officer Martin likewise went to Mr. Mobley's 
home for further investigation. (Trial Tr., p.237, Ls.13-17.) While there, the officer 
spoke with Mr. Mobley's young daughter, M.M. (Trial Tr., p.238, Ls.5-13.) M.M. was 5 
years old at the time. (Trial Tr., p.238, Ls.5-13.) Without objection, the officer testified 
that M.M. eventually was willing to speak to Officer Martin; that her comments indicated 
that something happened at the apartment and that there was a particular suspect; and 
that this suspect was Mr. Mobley. (Trial Tr., p.238, L.18 - p.239, L.4.) M.M. never 
testified at trial. (See Trial Tr., generally.) 
Following Officer Martin's testimony, the State called Miranda Stone to the stand. 
(Trial Tr., p.244, Ls.12-16.) Ms. Stone stated that she was a mutual friend of Ms. Deboi 
and Mr. Mobley. (Trial Tr., p.244, L.19 - p.245, L.15.) She testified that Mr. Mobley had 
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sent her a text message on the night of the alleged altercation, and they subsequently 
spoke on the phone that night. (Trial Tr., p.236, L.8 - p.247, L.16.) Ms. Stone was 
apparently storing some of Mr. Mobley's belongings. According to her testimony, 
Mr. Mobley had initially sent her a text message indicating that he wished to retrieve 
them. (Trial Tr., p.247, Ls.7-16.) In response, Ms. Stone called Mr. Mobley. (Trial 
Tr., p.247, Ls.17-20.) 
Ms. Stone testified that, during this conversation, Mr. Mobley stated that he had 
"popped" Ms. Deboi. (Trial Tr., p.248, Ls.13-17.) When asked what he meant by this 
statement, Ms. Stone represented that Mr. Mobley said he had given Ms. Deboi a 
"shiner." (Trial Tr., p.248, Ls.16-19.) According to Ms. Stone, Mr. Mobley stated that he 
and Ms. Deboi had been in an argument about Ms. Deboi's family. (Trial Tr., p.248, 
L.20 - p.249, L.21.) On cross-examination, Ms. Stone admitted that she and 
Mr. Mobley were having a disagreement regarding some of the property she was storing 
for him - specifically as to the ownership of this property. (Trial Tr., p.251, L.22 - p.252, 
L.22.) 
The State thereafter rested its case. (Trial Tr., p.255, Ls.17-19.) Mr. Mobley 
then presented his first witness - his boss, Shana Gentry. (Trial Tr., p.256, L.12 -
p.257, L.2.) Ms. Gentry testified that Mr. Mobley was an excellent employee who 
always worked very well with the tenants in the apartment complex where he did 
maintenance work. (Trial Tr., p.257, L.23 - p.258, L.10.) While Ms. Gentry never 
observed any instances where Mr. Mobley was angry with Ms. Deboi, she did see 
Ms. Deboi get in "disputes" with Mr. Mobley. (Trial Tr., p.259, Ls.18-24.) She also 
testified that she never had any problems with Mr. Mobley consuming alcohol in the 
course of his employment. (Trial Tr., p.259, L.25 - p.260, L.5.) 
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Mr. Mobley's mother, Sharon McDonald, was the next witness for the defense. 
(Trial Tr., p.260, L.21 - p.261, L.3.) The day after the alleged altercation, Ms. McDonald 
went to Mr. Mobley's residence to pick up some of his things. (Trial Tr., p.261, L.24 -
p.262, L.7.) But when Ms. McDonald went back to the house on another occasion to 
pick up more of Mr. Mobley's property, Ms. McDonald noticed that several of her and 
Mr. Mobley's things were missing. (Trial Tr., p.262, Ls.10-12.) This included a 
television, a video game console, and numerous other items that were antiques from 
Ms. McDonald's family that she had asked Mr. Mobley to store for her. (Trial Tr., p.263, 
L.21 - p.265, L.18.) Ms. McDonald also testified that she had never seen Mr. Mobley 
have a quick temper or engage in violence. (Trial Tr., p.267, Ls.1-6.) 
D.M., another of Mr. Mobley's daughters, also testified on her father's behalf. 
(Trial Tr., p.271, L.20 - p.272, L.8.) D.M. testified about statements related to her by 
Ms. Deboi as impeachment of Ms. Deboi's prior testimony regarding an incident that 
took place at a fast food restaurant. (Trial Tr., p.273, Ls.10-19.) According to D.M., 
Ms. Deboi had told D.M. that she had assaulted one of the workers at this restaurant by 
pulling the woman over the counter and then repeatedly kicking her. (Trial Tr., p.274, 
Ls.4-19.) Ms. Deboi told D.M. about the incident to explain why Ms. Deboi was not 
allowed to return to the restaurant to eat. (Trial Tr., p.274, Ls.16-19.) Ms. Deboi also 
had apparently made other admissions about going to parties and fighting with other 
people present there. (Trial Tr., p.275, Ls.7-11.) However, D.M. had never seen 
Mr. Mobley and Ms. Deboi engaging in any violent confrontation and had never seen 
her father hit anyone - including herself. (Trial Tr., p.275, L.22 - p.276, L.8.) 
Mr. Mobley testified on his own behalf. (Trial Tr., p.279, Ls.7-8.) He 
acknowledged that he and Ms. Deboi were fighting on the night in question about 
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various things, including custody of their shared daughter. (Trial Tr., p.279, L.16 -
p.281, L.7.) But Mr. Mobley denied that the verbal argument they were having ever 
turned physical. (Trial Tr., p.282, Ls.14-23.) In fact, he testified that he would not have 
been able to strangle Ms. Deboi or hit her with a closed fist. (Trial Tr., p.284, Ls.2-10.) 
This was because, as was testified to by Officer Martin, Mr. Mobley had a prior injury to 
his hand which required several of his fingers to be taped together - one of his fingers 
had been dislocated and he could not even close his hand or grip anything with any real 
degree of strength. (Trial Tr., p.284, L.11 - p.285, L.7.) 
Given the extent of their fight, Mr. Mobley believed that his relationship with 
Ms. Deboi was ending, particularly in light of the fact that Ms. Deboi threatened to 
withhold his youngest daughter from him and even told him that she would not let 
Mr. Mobley ever see his daughter again. (Trial Tr., p.283, Ls.4-23.) Mr. Mobley also 
indicated his intent to seek custody of their daughter. (Trial Tr., p.285, Ls.8-15.) 
Following this verbal argument, Mr. Mobley testified that Ms. Deboi took their daughter 
and left. (Trial Tr., p.286, Ls.1-3.) He only found out that Ms. Deboi accused him of 
becoming violent later on when police arrived at his home around midnight. (Trial 
Tr., p.287, L.20 - p.288, L.5.) 
Following his arrest, Mr. Mobley testified that he was unable to post bail on his 
own because all of the funds in his account - nearly $4,000 by his estimate - had been 
taken out of his account. (Trial Tr., p.290, Ls.18-25.) After he asked his mother to go to 
his house and retrieve his belongings, Mr. Mobley also found out that several items of 
his property had been taken - his television, antiques, titles to all of Mr. Mobley's 
vehicles, his bicycles, and "anything that was worth any amount of money," had been 
removed from his home. (Trial Tr., p.292, Ls.2-8.) Mr. Mobley also denied having told 
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Ms. Stone that he had hit Ms. Deboi. (Trial Tr., p.292, Ls.9-17.) He did, however, admit 
that he had consumed about three beers on the day of his fight with Ms. Deboi. (Trial 
Tr., p.296, Ls.4-6.) Mr. Mobley was the last witness on behalf of the defense. (Trial 
Tr., p.303, Ls.14-18.) 
During the course of the jury's deliberations, the jury sent the district court a note 
that said, "We're split on one of the charges. How do we proceed with the charge we're 
split on?" (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-10.) To this, the district court admonished the jurors to 
re-read a single paragraph from one of the jury instructions that read as follows: 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views, and deliberate 
with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without 
disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you must decide this case for 
yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and consideration of 
the case with your fellow jurors. 
(Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.11-12; Jury Instruction 28.) In conjunction with directing the jurors 
solely to this paragraph, the district court further told the jurors to, "continue to 
deliberate." (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.11-12.) When asked by the court whether he objected 
to the actions taken by the court, Mr. Mobley did not object. (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.15-17.) 
The jury acquitted Mr. Mobley of the offense of attempted strangulation, but 
convicted him of felony domestic battery and further found that he had committed this 
offense within the presence of a child. (Trial Tr., p.332, L.25 - p.334, L.14; R., p.82-85.) 
Mr. Mobley was sentenced to four and one-half years, with one and one-half years 
fixed, upon his conviction; but the district court thereafter suspended Mr. Mobley's 
sentence and placed him on probation for three years. (6/27/11 Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.14, 
L.6; R., pp.105-107.) Mr. Mobley timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and 
sentence. (R., p.109.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court violate Mr. Mobley's right to due process when the court provided 
the jury with a "dynamite" instruction upon being informed that the jury was deadlocked 
as to one of the counts in this case? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Violated Mr. Mobley's Right To Due Process When The Court 
Provided The Jury With A "Dynamite" Instruction Upon Being Informed That The Jury 
Was Deadlocked As To One Of The Counts In This Case 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Mobley asserts that the district court violated his due process rights when the 
district court provided the jury with a "dynamite" instruction upon the court being 
informed that the jurors were deadlocked with regard to one of the two charged offenses 
8. Standard Of Review 
Whether the jury was correctly instructed by the district court is an issue of law 
that this Court reviews de nova. See, e.g., State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-588 
(2011). 
C. The District Court Violated Mr. Mobley's Right To Due Process When The Court 
Provided The Jury With A "Dynamite" Instruction Upon Being Informed That The 
Jury Was Deadlocked As To One Of The Counts In This Case, And This Error 
Rose To The Level Of A Fundamental Error 
Mr. Mobley asserts that the district court's instruction to the jury, upon being 
informed that the jury was deadlocked and without prior consultation with counsel, was 
an impermissible "dynamite" instruction that violated his right to due process and rose to 
the level of a fundamental error. 
As an initial matter, Mr. Mobley did not object after being informed - after the fact 
- of the action already taken by the district court in providing the challenged dynamite 
instruction and ordering the jury to continue to deliberate. (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-17.) 
However, Mr. Mobley asserts that, because he was never afforded the opportunity to 
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make a contemporaneous objection in order to prevent this error, the three-part test for 
fundamental error should not apply in this case. 
Under this test, allegations of error that were not objected to at trial must meet 
three standards: (1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of his or her 
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be plain from the record 
without the need of additional information, including information as to whether the failure 
to object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning that there is a "reasonable 
possibility that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial." State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). The primary purpose of the fundamental error test is to 
encourage the making of contemporaneous objections to proposed actions by the 
district court in order to afford the trial court the opportunity to continue and resolve 
potential errors. Id. at 224. In doing so, the appellate courts in Idaho seek to 
"encourage the making of timely objections that result in the error being prevented or 
the harm being alleviated." Id. at 226. 
In this case, however, the district court unilaterally responded to and instructed 
the jury prior to ever giving Mr. Mobley or the State a chance to object to its instructions 
and avoid the prejudice that resulted. Accordingly, under unusual circumstances such 
as these where the district court takes it upon itself to instruct the jury without affording 
trial counsel an opportunity to object, Mr. Mobley asserts that the three-part test for 
fundamental error should not apply given that he was deprived by the court's actions of 
having the opportunity to raise an objection before the error had occurred.4 
4 However, Mr. Mobley also asserts that, even if this Court applies the fundamental error 
test applies under these facts, he meets this test. 
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"A dynamite instruction is one that directs a deadlocked jury to continue 
deliberating and exhorts those jurors holding a minority view to reconsider their 
position." State v. Gomez, 137 Idaho 671, 676 (2002) (quoting State v. Hernandez, 133 
Idaho 576, 586 (Ct. App. 1999)). In order to avoid exerting undue influence upon or 
coercing a jury, Idaho has adopted a "blanket prohibition against dynamite instructions." 
Id. (quoting State v. Flint, 114 Idaho 806, 812 (1988)). 
Even prior to the Idaho Supreme Court placing a blanket prohibition against the 
use of dynamite instructions in Idaho, the Idaho Court of Appeals presaged this holding 
in State v. Clay, wherein the Court of Appeals explained the constitutional 
underpinnings of prohibiting such instructions: 
Jury verdicts occupy an exalted place in our criminal justice system. 
When a properly instructed jury makes a finding of guilt upon admissible 
evidence, its finding must be upheld if "any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 
An appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of a jury 
regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight of their testimony, or the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. This vast 
deference to jury verdicts can be justified only if the integrity of the jury 
deliberation process is scrupulously maintained. Moreover, the 
constitutional guaranty of due process demands that an accused person 
receive a fair and impartial trial. This guaranty is violated if jury 
deliberations are tainted by undue pressure. 
State v. Clay, 112 Idaho 261,263 (Ct. App. 1987) (internal citations omitted). 
Based upon the pressures exerted by the district court in exhorting the jury to 
continue deliberating, coupled with the specific attention drawn by the trial court to the 
time and expenses that had been invested into the trial by the parties, the Clay court 
found that the trial court's instruction to the jury to continue deliberation exerted undue 
pressure on the jury and reversed the defendant's conviction. Clay, 112 Idaho at 263-
268. 
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One year later, the Idaho Supreme Court put to rest any future use of dynamite 
instructions when the trial court is confronted with a deadlocked jury. Flint, 114 Idaho at 
810-813. The Flint Court recognized that the use of a dynamite instruction was of 
constitutional dimension, adopting the reasoning of the court in Clay and reiterating that, 
"the constitutional guarantee of due process demands that an accused person receive a 
fair and impartial trial. This guarantee is violated if jury deliberations are tainted by 
undue pressure." Id. at 810 (quoting Clay, 112 Idaho at 263). In light of this concern, in 
conjunction with policy considerations, the Court in Flint held that, "[o]nly a blanket 
prohibition against dynamite instructions will sufficiently protect the deadlocked jurors 
from coercion." Id. at 812. While this prohibition does not prohibit a trial court from 
polling the jurors and - depending upon the responses of the jurors as a result of this 
inquiry - guiding them toward another period of deliberation, the Court cautioned 
against doing so if the jurors declared themselves deadlocked. Id. at 813. 
The constitutional dimension of this prohibition was re-affirmed by the Idaho 
Court of Appeals in State v. Timmons, 141 Idaho 376, 376-379 (Ct. App. 2005). The 
Timmons Court noted that, if jury deliberations are tainted by undue pressure from the 
court, the due process guarantee of the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury is 
violated. Id. at 377. While the court in Timmons did not find that the trial court's 
instructions in that case constituted an improper dynamite instruction, the court's 
holding rested on grounds that are not present here. Namely, in Timmons, the jury 
never indicated a definite split on the charge at issue, and the presiding juror 
affirmatively indicated that it was possible that a verdict could be reached if 
deliberations continued. Id. at 376-377. Additionally, the district court in Timmons 
never directed the juror holding a minority view to reconsider their positions. Id. In light 
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of this, the Timmons Court held that the instruction to continue deliberating was 
permissible; and that there was no need to inform the jurors regarding jury deadlock 
since the jurors affirmatively indicated that a verdict was possible. 
In contrast, in this case the jury informed the district court that they were actually 
split on one of the charges. (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.7-9.) There was no indication that the 
jury believed, that with further deliberation, this deadlock could be resolved. Unlike the 
trial court in Timmons, the district court did not inquire further as to whether this 
deadlock could be resolved prior to ordering the jury to continue deliberating. (Trial 
Tr., p.332, Ls.7-12.) And - as a critical distinction from Timmons - the jury was further 
exhorted to consider a single paragraph from the jury instructions that directed the 
jurors to re-consider their views with the objective of reaching a verdict. (Trial 
Tr., p.332, Ls.6-12; Instruction 28.) Accordingly, a different result should be reached in 
this case. 
Moreover, even prior to Idaho's prohibition against the use of dynamite 
instructions, Idaho courts were careful to caution that such instructions must be 
provided to the jury along with, and in the context of, all of the other instructions in a 
given case so as to avoid any undue influence or pressure upon the jury. See, e.g., 
State v. Bailey, 94 Idaho 285, 292 (1971) (overruled by Flint, 114 Idaho at 810-813). 
However, the exact opposite occurred in this case. Rather than instruct the jury to 
consider the jury instructions in their entirety, or even to consider Instruction 28 as a 
whole, the district court in this case directed the jurors to continue to deliberate after 
telling them to re-read only paragraph 6 of Instruction 28. 
This exhortation on the part of the trial court was specifically in response to the 
jurors' query as to what they should do next, given that they were split on one of the 
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charges. (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-12.) Accordingly, the court's response to go back and 
continue deliberations only was an incomplete response to the jury's query, given that 
the district court did not reveal to the jurors that a verdict was not necessary and that a 
mistrial could be declared if they were deadlocked. This instruction therefore could 
have misled the jury into the false belief that they were required to reach a verdict, 
regardless of whether the jurors were individual split in their personal belief as to guilt or 
innocence. See Gomez, 137 Idaho at 677 (reversing the defendant's conviction where 
the court's instruction may have left the jury with the erroneous impression as to the 
effect of a deadlock). 
As important, the court's response directed the jurors to only a portion of the jury 
instruction regarding conduct during deliberations - and only that portion that 
encouraged the jurors to re-examine their own views "with the objective of reaching an 
agreement." (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-12; Instruction 28.) The district court specifically 
omitted the paragraph that followed. This is significant, particularly in light of the jurors' 
query, because the paragraph omitted by the district court provided that no juror, 
"should surrender your honest opinion as to the weight or effect of the evidence or as to 
the innocence or guilt of the defendant because the majority of the jury feels otherwise 
or for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict." (Instruction 28.) This likely left the 
jurors with the impression that, despite the split of opinion on the jurors as to guilt or 
innocence, they were absolutely required to continue to deliberate until a verdict was 
actually reached. Such an instruction would likewise mislead the jury. See Gomez, 137 
Idaho at 677. 
Moreover, this error was plain from the record and the failure to object was not 
the result of reasonable trial strategy. Mr. Mobley in this case, by pleading not guilty to 
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the charges, expressly invoked his right to a jury trial. This right necessarily carries with 
it, as a fundamental guarantee of due process, the right to a fair and impartial jury that is 
not tainted in its deliberations by coercion. "The right to a fair and impartial jury goes to 
the foundation of the right to a fair trial." State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590, 601 (Ct. App. 
1992). This right to a jury trial by a fair and impartial jury is personal to the defendant, 
and cannot be waived by the strategic choice of trial counsel. See, e.g., State v. 
Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 7 42 (Ct. App. 2003) (noting the right to a jury trial as among 
those fundamental rights that can only be waived by the defendant personally). 
Additionally, there is no apparent strategic advantage to Mr. Mobley in not 
objecting to the coercive pressures applied by the district court in using this instruction. 
The Court of Appeals in Clay recognized that the result of a jury deadlock will quite 
often be that the State will re-examine the strength of its case and the wisdom of 
seeking to retry the defendant. "Where jurors honestly have tried and failed to reach a 
verdict, the prosecutor undoubtedly will reexamine the case. In some instances, a new 
trial may be requested; in others, the jury's inability to agree may be allowed to stand as 
the last official word on the issue of the defendant's guilt." Clay, 112 Idaho at 264. This 
is particularly true where, as here, there has already been one previous trial during 
which a unanimous verdict was not possible. Under such circumstances, a third 
attempt at retrial was far less likely and a mistrial would likely "stand as the last official 
word" on Mr. Mobley's guilt. 
Finally, there is a reasonable possibility that this error contributed to the jury's 
verdict. First, it is notable that the first jury in this case was unable to render a verdict 
on any of the State's charges, and therefore a mistrial had to be declared. (R., pp.39-
53.) Several courts have considered this a factor in showing the prejudice of dynamite 
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instructions. Clay, 112 Idaho at 268. Additionally, this case was largely a contest of 
credibility between Ms. Deboi and Mr. Mobley - while Ms. Deboi was apparently injured 
at some point on the night in question, only the testimony of these two witnesses 
directly addressed where the source of those injuries arose. This is likewise a factor 
that has been considered as showing the potential prejudice of such an instruction. 
Clay, 112 Idaho at 268. Finally, given the relatively short duration between the district 
court's instruction to the jurors to continue deliberating and reconsider their views, and 
the resulting verdict that was announced, there is ever possibility that the pressure from 
the district court to reach a verdict in this case contributed to Mr. Mobley's resulting 
conviction. 
The district court in this case improperly pressured and coerced the jury to reach 
a verdict, and failed to properly instruct the jury as to the fact that a unanimous verdict 
was not strictly required. This deprived Mr. Mobley of his constitutional right to a fair 
trial and to a fair and impartial jury. Accordingly, Mr. Mobley asks that this Court 
reverse his judgment of conviction and sentence and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Maynard respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction and sentence, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this th day of November, 2012. 
SARAHE.TOINS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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